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ABSTRACT
Decade-long negotiations between the Arab
Republic of Egypt and the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia surround the decision to build the hydroelectric
power plant along the River Nile. For much of Ethiopia, the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam represents a beacon of
prosperity. For countless Egyptians, the structure embodies
a potential catastrophe. Grounded in threats of
displacement for Egyptian agricultural communities, some
have compared the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
crisis to disasters culminating in mass migration.
This battle for natural resource access has
intensified as climate change exacerbates the region’s dire
conditions. Specifically, exhaustible resource allocation
amid climate change indicates that regional development,
competition, and associated conflict will increase. While
development opportunities along the Nile may in fact
facilitate expansive economic transformation for the region,
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam conflict illustrates
heightening conflict between two key African states, leaving
potential regional success in jeopardy and military combat
a growing reality. International water law remains at the
conflict’s forefront as governments, scholars, and
J.D. Candidate at Georgetown University Law Center, Class of 2021
and B.A. at Cornell University, 2018. I am thankful to my mentors Katrin
Kuhlmann who was a pillar of support throughout the research and writing
process; Madhavi Sunder who guided me towards the courses and professors
who would show the endless encouragement she showed me; and Cedric
Asiavugwa (July 1986 - March 2019) who showed me the importance of African
and Middle Eastern representation in legal scholarship. I dedicate this to my late
grandfather, Fawzy Mohamed Darwish, a scholar of his time and region.
*

537

538

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

international organizations grapple with vital legal
questions. The way international water law is applied to the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam crisis will be influential
and create powerful international legal precedent for global
transboundary waterways. For this reason, international
and regional bodies must acknowledge the foreseeable
future where upstream and downstream confrontations for
exhaustible resource-based development opportunities are
common.
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INTRODUCTION
Along the Blue Nile in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region
and approximately 40 kilometers east of Sudan, Ethiopia’s new Grand
Renaissance Dam (“GERD”) seeks to generate power through two
power stations, three spillways, and a saddle dam.1 Estimated to reach
a height of 145 meters with a length of 1800 meters, the GERD is
projected to store an estimated 63 billion cubic million meters of
water.2 The hydropower plant would provide electricity to 60% of
Ethiopians at a grand cost of 4.5 billion USD.3 As Africa’s largest dam,
the GERD spans the Blue Nile tributary where Egypt and Ethiopia
receive most of their water resources. Preliminary plans for
constructing the GERD became public in March 2011, approximately
one month after the Egyptian Mubarak regime’s collapse and just a
month before construction commenced.4 Since the beginning of its
construction, Egyptian leaders consistently challenged Ethiopia’s legal
authority to construct and fill the GERD. In response, Ethiopian
leaders cited opposing legal authority to justify their government’s
unwavering persistence to build and fill the GERD. The GERD is
projected to become fully operative between 2020 and 2022.5 As of
May 2020, the GERD’s total construction had reached approximately
73%.6
1
See Aktas & Erdem, Ethiopia begins filling controversial Nile Dam,
ANADOLU AGENCY (July 16, 2020), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/ethiopiabegins-filling-controversial-nile-dam/1912030; Ker Than, Egypt Moves Forward
with Massive Nile Dam Project, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (July 14, 2011),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/7/ethiopia-south-sudan-nile-damriver-water/ (The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, formerly referred to as the
Millennium Dam and the Hidase Dam, is also referred to as the Great Renaissance
Dam.).
2
MWANGI S. KIMENYI & JOHN M. MBAKU, GOVERNING THE NILE RIVER
BASIN, 107 (2015).
3
Meron Moges-Gerbi, Tensions over Nile River dam project as heavy rain
sows confusions, CNN (Aug. 13, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/21/africa/ethiopia-nile-river-dam-afr-intl/index.html.
4
Al Jazeera English, What’s behind the Egypt-Ethiopia Nile
Dispute?, YOUTUBE (Jan. 26, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdizU0arrJ0&vl=en.
5
See Aaron Maasho, Ethiopia expected Nile dam to be ready to start
operation in late 2020, REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/usethiopa-dam/ethiopia-expects-nile-dam-to-be-ready-to-start-operation-in-late-2020idUSKCN1OX0T4.
6
Ayah Aman, Nile dam talks stall again amidst Egyptian-Ethiopian
dispute, MIDDLE EAST MONITOR (May 22, 2020), https://www.al-
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Both Egypt and Ethiopia have exhibited tremendous reluctance
to reach a compromise with respect to GERD-related issues.
Ethiopia’s timetable for filling the GERD’s reservoir and the GERD’s
general management during droughts posed particularly tremendous
challenges during negotiations.7 While officials in Addis Ababa argue
that the GERD would not significantly affect the Nile’s water flow and
instead name potential benefits to drought migration and water
salinity, Egypt rejects such arguments and fears substantial disruption
to Nile water access, especially for its commercial water supply.8
Egypt has repeatedly called upon the international community to stop
Ethiopia’s filling of the GERD.9 Powers like the United States have
cut foreign aid from Ethiopia, which comes at little surprise given the
strong U.S.–Egyptian alliance and robust Chinese support for the
GERD.10
As Ethiopia began filling the GERD, Egypt appealed to the
United Nations Security Council in May 2020, arguing that Ethiopian
intentions to fill the GERD violate Ethiopia’s obligation to respect
international law.11 Egypt’s letter calls upon the international
community to urge Ethiopian compliance with its obligations pursuant
to a 2015 Declaration of Principles that compelled Egypt, Ethiopia,
and Sudan to negotiate a comprehensive solution for the GERD’s
filling and operation.12 The Declaration came shortly after the
Ethiopian irrigation minister announced Ethiopia’s intention to
commence the first stage of filling the GERD without having shared
the plan’s details with either Egypt or Sudan.13

monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/egypt-letter-un-security-council-etihiopianile-dam-sudan.html.
7
See John M. Mbaku, The controversy over the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam, BROOKINGS (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-overthe-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
See id.
11
Egypt sent letter about GERD crisis to UN Security Council - Foreign
Minister, AHRAM ONLINE (May 7, 2020),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/1/368823/Egypt/Egypt-sent-letterabout-GERD-crisis-to-UN-Security.aspx.
12
Id.
13
See id.
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The GERD serves as a timely reminder that exhaustible natural
resource disputes enable regional conflict between neighbors. The
GERD conflict further elucidates the Nile’s role within Africa as a base
of historical reliance for Egypt and beacon of hope for Ethiopia.
However, the conflict does not merely implicate Egypt and Ethiopia;
other nations, particularly riparian nations along the Nile, hold high
stakes in the conflict’s outcome, especially Sudan, which also receives
a significant portion of its water from the Blue Nile tributary to supply
and power its nation. This Note argues that the GERD conflict could
very well establish international legal precedent for transboundary
waterways. As GERD-related negotiations and tensions rise along a
transboundary riverway where climate change and poverty alleviation
are central concerns, the likelihood for shifting the historical
international water law framework along the Nile, and consequently
other transboundary riverways, also increases.
The Introduction of this Note has briefly summarized the recent
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam crisis and its relationship with
international water law. Part I discusses the River Nile’s historical and
cultural significance to Egypt and Ethiopia to contextualize what led
to the crisis. Part II highlights main instruments that are frequently
applied to the crisis and universal ideas within the international legal
framework. Part III outlines and analyzes the respective legal
arguments both parties have used to justify their positions towards the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’s construction and filling. Part IV
concludes by arguing that the case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam could shape customary international water law by settling the
legal principles that dictate water competition along transboundary
riverways.
I.

THE RIVER NILE’S ROLE IN EGYPT & ETHIOPIA

The GERD conflict highlights the undeniably essential role the
Nile plays for many African countries. As the longest river in the
world, the Nile flows south to north, with its drainage basin reaching
11 countries.14 Beginning from Lake Victoria’s Nile Basin, the Nile
flows over 4100 miles until its final destination off of Egypt’s coast
into the Mediterranean Sea.15 The Nile contains two main streams: the
14
Salam Abdulrahman, The River Nile and Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance
Dam: challenges to Egypt’s Security Approach, 76 INT’L J. OF ENVTL. STUD. 136,
139 (Sept. 3, 2018).
15
See id.
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White Nile flowing in Uganda from Lake Victoria composing 30% of
the Nile’s waters, and the Blue Nile flowing from Ethiopia’s Lake
Tana composing about 60% of the Nile.16 Both streams meet near the
Sudanese capital of Khartoum. From there, the Nile converges and
flows downstream to Egypt.
The Nile Basin Area includes Tanzania, Rwanda, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan,
Eritrea, Egypt, Ethiopia, and portions of Burundi.17 Each Nile Basin
country maintains its own interest in developing hydroelectric projects
along the waterway for natural resource and energy access.
Figure 1: The River Nile flows from south to north.
The GERD is labeled in red along the EthiopianSudanese border.

As Egypt and
Ethiopia assert their
social,
political,
economic, and legal arguments for
and
against
the
GERD’s
construction,
each
nation’s
respective value for the Nile has
become apparent. For Egypt, the
country’s relationship with the
Nile stretches back to its deep
colonial roots and historical
reliance upon the Nile for
agriculture,
commerce,
and
18
electricity.
Meanwhile,
Ethiopian desire for the GERD’s
construction stems from the Nile’s
role in connecting Ethiopians to
the nation’s electric grid,
addressing widespread poverty, and elevating Ethiopia’s geopolitical
position in Africa.19 To grasp the origin of each party’s arguments
fully, one must explore the underlying histories that brand the Nile as
Egypt’s historic gift and Ethiopia’s beacon of prosperity.
16

Kevin G. Wheeler et. al, Cooperative filling approaches for the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, 41 WATER INT’L 611, 613–614 (May 11, 2016).
17
See Major Subbasins, NILE BASIN INITIATIVE,
https://nilebasin.org/media-center/maps.
18
See Mwangi S. Kimenyi & John Mukum Mbaku, The limits of the new
“Nile agreement”, BROOKINGS (April 28, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/04/28/the-limits-of-the-newnile-agreement/.
19
Id.
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A. Egypt’s Gift of the Nile
For thousands of years, the Nile has provided Egypt with its
main source of freshwater. Modern towns and villages in Egypt are
situated along the Nile’s banks and its delta.20 Because Egypt’s annual
rainfall and groundwater are extremely low, Egypt faces an alarming
water crisis.21 With a population of approximately 370 million, the
Nile Basin’s population includes 160 million whose livelihood relies
upon the watercourse.22 Coupled with its water crisis and dry climate,
Egypt’s population has grown from 23 million in 1955 to over 99
million today.23 By 2050, the population is projected to reach 153
million as the Nile supports approximately 95% of the country’s
population—all of whom live within twelve miles of the Nile or its
Delta.24
The Nile’s flow across Egypt is principally controlled through
the Aswan High Dam located in Upper Egypt where the Nile arrives
to Egyptian territories. The Aswan High Dam provides the Egyptian
agricultural sector with the ability to cultivate its land by taming the
Nile’s unpredictable irrigation patterns and flooding while providing
many Egyptian villages with electricity.25
Historically, Egypt’s legal and political control over the Nile
extends back to the nation’s historical colonial period in which it

20

Richard Conniff, The Vanishing Nile: A Great River Faces a Multitude
of Threats, YALE SCHOOL OF FORESTRY & ENVTL. STUD. (April 6, 2017),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/vanishing-nile-a-great-river-faces-a-multitude-ofthreats-egypt-dam.
21
Randa Bedawy, Water resources management: alarming crisis for
Egypt, 4 J. OF MGMT. AND SUSTAINABILITY 108, 115 (Aug. 29, 2014).
22
See Kimenyi, supra note 18.
23
Abdulrahman, supra note 14, at 136–37.
24
Salam Abdulrahman, The River Nile and Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance
Dam: challenges to Egypt’s Security Approach, 76 INT’L J. OF ENV. STUD. 136,
136-137 (Sept. 2018); Daniel Abebe, “Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile: The
Economics of International Water Law, University of Chicago Public Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper No. 484, (2014); Declan Walsh & Somini Sengupta, For
Thousands of Years, Egypt Controlled the Nile. A New Dam Threatens That, THE
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/09/world/africa/nile-river-dam.html.
25
See M.A. Abu-Zeid & F. Z. El-Shibini, Egypt’s High Aswan Dam, 13
INT’L J. OF WATER RESOURCES DEV. 209, 209–10 (July 21, 2010).
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remained under British control beginning in 1882.26 By allocating
waters between Egypt and the Sudan without regard for other riparian
nations’ potential access to the Nile’s waters, the British essentially
granted the two nations a veto power over any upstream development
projects. Using this as its legal and diplomatic basis for control over
the waterway, Egypt built significant natural resource reliance upon
the waters it was gifted by its former colonizers. Over the century to
come, this reliance would become extremely dangerous and emerge as
a recurring theme during numerous rounds of GERD conflict
negotiations.
Since 2011, the Egyptian and Ethiopian governments have
criticized each other’s stances on the GERD’s construction. Egypt’s
foreign policy towards the GERD has illustrated the notion that “with
projected climate change and anticipated water shortages in such areas
as the Middle East, northern and eastern Africa, South Asia, among
others, water is increasingly viewed within the lens of national
security.”27 As early as 1979, President Anwar Sadat said, “the only
matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.”28 In 2014, former
President Mohamed Morsi indicated “all options are open” in response
to the impending water supply threat posed by the GERD, stating that
“if [the Nile] diminishes by one drop then blood is the other
alternative” alluding to potential military action.29 Egyptian President
Abdelfattah al-Sisi recently framed the GERD as a matter of life and
death for Egyptians, stating that “the Nile is a question of life, a matter
of existence to Egypt.”30

See David J. Mentiply, The British Invasion of Egypt, 1882, E-INT’L
RELATIONS (Mar. 23, 2009), https://www.e-ir.info/2009/03/23/the-british-invasionof-egypt-1882/.
27
Edith B. Weiss, The Evolution of International Environmental Law, 54
JAPANESE Y.B. INTL. L. 1, 18 (2011).
28
See Next on Egypt’s to-do: Ethiopia and the Nile, AL-JAZEERA (Dec. 9,
2013), https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/12/9/next-on-egypts-to-doethiopia-and-the-nile.
29
Egyptian warning over Ethiopia Nile dam, BBC AFRICA (June 10,
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22850124.
30
Sisi says Nile water issue a matter of life and death for Egypt, wants
Sudan removed from terror list, AL-AHRAM ONLINE (Sept. 24, 2019),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/351461/Egypt/Politics-/Sisi-saysNile-water-issue-a-matter-of-life-and-de.aspx; Declan Walsh & Somini Sengupta,
For Thousands of Years, Egypt Controlled the Nile. A New Dam Threatens That,
THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/09/world/africa/nile-river-dam.html.
26
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For the Egyptian government, the GERD threatens a reliance
built upon the Nile for millennia. Egyptian government studies
estimate that for each decrease “of 1 billion cubic meters of water,
200,000 acres of farmland would be lost” while affecting the
livelihoods of 1 million and reducing the Aswan High Dam’s power
generation by a third.31 Perceived as a potential catastrophe for
Egyptians, the GERD would cut Egypt’s water supply, depending on
the speed at which Ethiopia chooses to fill the GERD’s reservoir and
the GERD’s management during extreme weather events.
B. Ethiopia’s Beacon of Prosperity
Ethiopia’s use of the Nile has been limited by Egypt’s historic
control over the Nile as a downstream nation. Ethiopia’s population
now exceeds more than 100 million and as its population continues to
rise, Ethiopia’s demand for water also increases. While Ethiopia
receives considerable amounts of precipitation measured at an average
of 815.8 millimeters annually, climate change has disrupted
precipitation patterns across Africa, and consequently, destabilized the
Nile’s flow.32
For many Ethiopians, the Nile provides hope for a nation to
escape poverty by providing electricity to approximately two-thirds of
Ethiopians who lack access.33 By building one of the largest
hydroelectric power plants in the world along its border with Sudan,
the GERD, as its name suggests, symbolizes a form of rebirth for
approximately 75 million people.34 The GERD would also generate
6,000 megawatts, which is approximately 2,000 megawatts more than
Ethiopia’s current generating capacity, enabling Ethiopia to sell and
export electricity.35
The Ethiopian government expressed its intention to fill the
GERD’s reservoir between the next 5 to 6 years, noting the immediate
31

Death of the Nile: Egypt fears Ethiopian dam will cut into its water
supply, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/02/death-nile-egypt-fearsethiopiandam-will-cut-water-supply/.
32
Climate Change Knowledge Portal, Ethiopia – Country Context,
WORLD BANK GROUP,
https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/ethiopia.
33
Al Jazeera English, supra note 4.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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benefits of power generation.36 This would reduce the Nile’s flow by
an estimated 25%, severely impacting the Egyptian economy.37
Instead, Egypt requests that the GERD be filled over a 12 to 18-year
timeframe citing Egypt’s need to adapt to a “huge water share deficit,
causing the end of agricultural expansion” as well as “a possible
reduction of the currently cultivated area, an increase of salinity in the
northern part of the Delta, damage to potable water stations, the
collapse of canals and drains, and environmental destabilization.”38
The Nile’s significance to the Egyptian and Ethiopian
governments differs. While Egyptians view the Nile as a staple of
historic civilization and modern sustenance, Ethiopians envision a new
future with the GERD as its latest technological contribution to the
livelihood of its people. Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s battle for control over
the Nile has only incited greater political, military, and diplomatic
escalation.
II.

A MODERN INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW

Humans struggle to delineate the legal boundaries that govern
bodies of water. As an ambient resource, water does not abide by the
boundaries drawn by the humans who seek its access. The world
contains many examples of nations that struggle to find mutually
beneficial terms to water supply access while at the same time
maintaining cordial relations.39 In fact, the 246 largest rivers in the
world flow through basins that are shared with another nation.40 This
is also true in regions like Egypt and Ethiopia, which harbor arid and
semi-arid lands.41 Despite its recent evolution and growth,

36

See Mbaku, supra note 7.
Foreign Staff, Death of the Nile: Egypt fears Ethiopian dam will cut into
its water supply, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/02/death-nile-egypt-fearsethiopiandam-will-cut-water-supply/.
38
See Randa Bedawy, supra note 66.
39
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Berlin rules on water resources: the new
paradigm for international water law, World Environmental and Water Resource
Congress, ASCE LIBR. 2 (2012),
https://ascelibrary.org/doi/10.1061/40856%28200%29250.
40
Id.
41
Basin Climate Zones, NILE BASIN INITIATIVE (last updated 2016-2017),
https://atlas.nilebasin.org/treatise/nile-basin-climate-zones/.
37
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Riparian nations tend to rely on highly debated legal concepts
within international agreements to argue for river access, including
territorial sovereignty and absolute integrity of the river.43 Upstream
riparian nations, such as Ethiopia, often argue that absolute territorial
sovereignty provides the legal right to access and use a river’s water
regardless of its effect on other riparian nations.44 Meanwhile,
downstream riparian nations like Egypt typically rely on claims that
invoke the absolute integrity of the river, arguing that upstream
riparian nations cannot perform actions that affect the quantity, quality,
or flow of the watercourse.45 Of the many important international
water law principles, two vital legal concepts that fuel GERD
negotiations are principles of (1) reasonable and equitable utilization
(“equitable utilization”) and (2) the duty not to cause significant harm
(“no-harm rule”). Both principles are codified in the General
Assembly’s United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Water Courses.46
The international community coined the principle of equitable
utilization to balance the tension between absolute territorial
sovereignty and absolute integrity of the river.47 Equitable utilization
provides that all co-riparian nations with a stake in an international
watercourse may use its resources in a manner that does not disrupt
another co-riparian nation’s interest, calling for development and use
along the river “but in a fair and reasonable manner.”48 Employing a
42

See Mark Zeitoun, The relevance of international water law to laterdeveloping upstream states, 40 WATER INT’L 968, 972 (2015).
43
User’s Guide Factsheet Series: Number 10 - Theories of Resource
Allocation, UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION 1, 1 (2006),
https://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/documents/UNWC-Fact-Sheet-10Theories-of-Resource-Allocation.pdf [hereinafter User’s Guide Factsheet No. 10].
44
See id.
45
Article 5.1.1 Theories of Allocation, UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION,
https://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/the-convention/part-ii-generalprinciples/article-5-equitable-and-reasonable-utilisation-and-participation/5-1-1theories-of-allocation/.
46
See Report of Sixth Committee, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 49th Sess., 3d
pen. mtg. at 12, 15, U.N. Doc. A/48/738 art. 5–7 (1994).
47
See User’s Guide Factsheet No. 10, supra note 43.
48
Albert E. Utton, Which Rule Should Prevail in International Water
Disputes: That of Reasonableness or that of No Harm, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 635,
637 (1996).
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theory of limited territorial sovereignty, equitable utilization
recognizes all riparian nations’ right to use water from a common
source with an obligation to ensure that their use does not unreasonably
interfere with that of another riparian nation.49 Alternatively, lower
riparian states rely on the no-harm rule, which requires that States take
all appropriate measures to prevent significant harm to other
watercourse States through their use of the water source.50 The noharm rule has been defined as a widely recognized principle of
customary international law where a State maintains an obligation to
prevent, reduce, and control the risk of environmental harm and other
significant harm to other watercourse States.51 Upstream riparian
States generally oppose the no-harm rule out of fear that it could curb
development opportunities. On the other hand, downstream States
generally oppose equitable utilization for fear that it permits harm
generated by upstream development that will inevitably impact
downstream states. While customary international law embraces the
no-harm rule, countries continue to debate the standard for equitable
utilization often pitting the clear standard for no-harm at odds with the
unclear standard for equitable utilization.52
Although international law outlines parameters for
transboundary riverways like the Nile, tensions between the legal
concepts of no-harm and equitable utilization persist, demonstrating a
chief constraint to resolving the GERD conflict. With the longest river
in the world at its focal point, the GERD conflict’s underlying legal
rationale retains enough influence to shift international water law’s
historical preference from the no-harm rule to equitable utilization, or
instead consolidate the no-harm rule as the dominant legal principle
guiding international water law.

49

See id.
User’s Guide Factsheet Series: Number 5 - No Significant Harm Rule,
UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION 1, 1 (2006),
https://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/documents/UNWC-Fact-Sheet-5-NoSignificant-Harm-Rule.pdf [hereinafter User’s Guide Factsheet No. 5].
51
See Int’l Law Ass’n [ILA], Rep. of the Fifty-Second Conference,
Helsinki, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers,
(Aug. 14-20, 1966) [Helsinki Rules].
52
See Attila M. Tanzi, The inter-relationship between no harm, equitable
and reasonable utilisation and cooperation under international water law, 20
INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 619, 619 (2020),
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10784-020-09502-7.
50
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International water law is largely defined in three main legal
instruments: the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers (“Helsinki Rules”), the United Nations
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water
Courses (“UN Watercourse Convention”), and the Berlin Rules on
Water Resources (“Berlin Rules”). The Helsinki Rules, UN
Watercourse Convention, and Berlin Rules recognize the challenges
posed by an application of equitable utilization and attempt to clarify
the factors relevant for determining the use of an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Adopted by the
International Law Association in 2004, the Berlin Rules superseded
the Helsinki Rules and summarize modern international customary
water law for domestic freshwater resources and those that cross
international borders. Authors of the Berlin Rules noted that the
guidelines “express rules of law as they presently stand and, to a small
extent, rules not yet binding legal obligation,” but those that are
budding into customary international law.53 Like equitable utilization,
the no-harm rule was also incorporated in the Helsinki Rules and later
reiterated in the UN Watercourse Convention and the Berlin Rules. By
outlining non-exhaustive, relevant factors and circumstances that
weigh in favor or against a nation’s utilization, these legal instruments
all identify the following factors in common: geography, hydrology,
climate, existing/past utilization, social and economic needs of riparian
nations; populations dependent on the watercourse; and availability of
alternative resources or uses.54
A. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers
Adopted by the International Law Association in August 1966,
The Helsinki Rules serve as the foundational modern legal document
regulating rivers crossing national boundaries.55 As one of the initial
international legal documents to identify a need for equitable
utilization, Article IV of the Helsinki Rules rejects a nation’s unlimited
sovereignty to maintain “the unqualified right to utilize and dispose of

53

See Berlin Rules on Water Resources, ILA (Aug. 21, 2004) (preface).
See Helsinki Rules, supra note 51; Report of Sixth Committee, U.N.
GAOR 6th Comm., 49th Sess., 3d pen. mtg. at 12, 15, U.N. Doc. A/48/738 (1994);
ILA, Berlin Rules on Water Resources art. 13, Aug. 21, 2004 [hereinafter Berlin
Rules].
55
See Helsinki Rules art. 4, supra note 51.
54
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the waters of an international river flowing through its territories.”56
Instead, the Helsinki Rules recognize that a State must consider
economic and social needs of co-basin States, which could result in
one basin State receiving more water than its neighbors.57 To
determine reasonable and equitable shares of co-basin States, Article
V outlines a list of factors to consider, such as the basin’s geography,
hydrology, climate, past and existing utilization, and dependent
population.58 Other factors include each basin State’s economic and
social needs, alternatives to satisfy those economic and social needs,
additional resource availability, and the degree to which a State’s
needs may be met without causing substantial injury to a co-basin
State.59
While the Helsinki Rules acknowledge ideas of cooperation,
appropriate compensation, and equitable distribution of waters, they
lack an enforcement mechanism.60 The incredibly vague set of factors
weighed in totality without a dispute resolution mechanism other than
the joint agency procedure outlined in Chapter 6 of the Helsinki Rules
creates a major dilemma for international water law: the two
simultaneously applicable legal doctrines, equitable utilization and noharm, can be weaponized by multiple parties and result in a conflict
based on riparian States’ inconsistent interests. Without objectively
institutionalizing equitable utilization, dispute resolution institutions
engineered by the Helsinki Rules are bound to face numerous
obstacles. At the time of its adoption by the International Law
Association, the Helsinki Rules were not considered binding
international law. Nevertheless, the Helsinki Rules forged the
beginnings of a growing body of law, leading to the UN Watercourse
Convention and the Berlin Rules, respectively.61
Since the International Law Association’s adoption of the
Helsinki Rules, equitable utilization has become a principal tenet of
56

See id.
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customary international water law. Despite being outlined in both the
UN Watercourse Convention and the Berlin Rules, equitable
utilization remains notorious for its ambiguity.62 Applying equitable
utilization in no-harm situations generates debate and tension among
proponents of each respective legal principle.
B. United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Water Courses
Rather than endorsing the Helsinki Rules, the United Nations
requested a set of draft articles on non-navigational uses of
international watercourses from the International Law Commission,
which would be reworked into the General Assembly’s UN
Watercourse Convention.63 Approved by a vote of 103 to 3 with 27
abstentions, the UN Watercourse Convention incorporates principal
values of international water law to curb potential conflicts, but has yet
to be ratified by a single Nile riparian State.64 The law also has not
evolved at the same speed as pressures surrounding natural resource
access, particularly with climate strains in dry regions.
The UN Watercourse Convention has been criticized for its
failure to integrate environmental and ecological concerns as well as
pertinent human rights into its body of international water law.65 The
main drafting debate at the UN Watercourse Convention was the
tension between equitable utilization and the no-harm rule, both of
which the General Assembly approved.66 The UN Watercourse
Convention codified the rule of equitable utilization and participation
in Article 5, requiring that watercourse states utilize an international
watercourse in “an equitable and reasonable manner” with the purpose
of “attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits
therefrom.”67 Under Article 5, equitable utilization must account for
downstream nation interests and “adequate protection of the

62
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watercourse.”68 Article 5 also provides that riparian States “participate
in the use, development and protection of [the] international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner,” stipulating that
participation includes a right to use the watercourse and duty to
cooperate in protection and development.69
The UN Watercourse Convention also observes the no-harm
rule in Article 7, stating that riparian nations maintain a legal
obligation not to cause significant harm to other riparian nations by
taking “all appropriate measures” including the elimination or
mitigation of such harm as well as potential compensation where
appropriate.70 While crafted to be read with Articles 5 and 6, Article
7 creates a clearer, more easily applicable legal basis for downstream
nations who can prove that greater use or development along a
watercourse by other riparian nations could cause significant harm to
water use. Based on the UN Watercourse Convention, watercourse
states must “take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of
significant harm to other watercourse states.”71 According to the
United Nations, the obligation to ‘take all appropriate measures’ is an
obligation of due diligence “proportioned to the magnitude of the
subject and to the dignity and strength of the power which is exercising
it.”72 The no-harm rule thereby does not create an absolute ban on
transboundary harm. Article 7(2) attempts to clarify the relationship
between both principles, maintaining that any State causing harm to
another must “take all appropriate measures, having due regard to the
provisions of Article 5 and 6 to eliminate or mitigate such harm” where
Article 5 provides that States use their waters in an equitable and
reasonable manner and Article 6 outlines the non-exhaustive list of
factors that should be considered when determining equitable
utilization.73
The UN Watercourse Convention’s 37 articles highlight coriparian obligations to share common resources, consult one another,
protect the environment, and resolve disagreements.74 While the
articles on environmental protection certainly extend beyond
68
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analogous provisions within the Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourse
Convention’s articles are limited in scope to transboundary water
issues, refuse to include interdependent groundwater concerns, and fail
to elucidate the relationship between the rules of equitable utilization
and no-harm for co-riparian States in conflict.
C. Berlin Rules on Water Resources
The Berlin Rules serve as a progressive attempt by the
International Law Association to reformulate the Helsinki Rules to
integrate international environmental law and international human
rights law. By focusing on domestic and international participatory
water management, conjunctive management, integrated management,
sustainability, and environmental harm,75 the Berlin Rules advance
concepts crafted for the international and transboundary customary
water law context: cooperation, equitable utilization, and no-harm.76
Outlined in Article 11 of the Berlin Rules, the principle of
cooperation ensures that basin States cooperate in good faith while
managing waters for the mutual benefit of participating states.77 This
principle is immediately followed by equitable utilization in Article
12, which reiterates the UN Watercourse Convention’s definition of
equitable utilization while incorporating the obligation to avoid
causing significant harm to other basin States.78 Additionally, the
Berlin Rules complement other factors that are considered for
equitable utilization determinations, including sustainability of
proposed or existing water uses and the minimization of environmental
harm.79
The Berlin Rules define the no-harm rule to ensure basin States
refrain from acts that cause significant harm to other basin States while
respecting each basin States right to equitable utilization of waters.80
While the UN Watercourse Convention’s expression of the no-harm
rule references equitable utilization as a simultaneous obligation for
75
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States, the Berlin Rules departs from merely referencing equitable
utilization by explicitly stating that basin States must “refrain from and
prevent acts or omissions within their territory that cause significant
harm to another basin State having due regard for the right of each
basin State to make equitable and reasonable use of the waters.”81 The
Berlin Rules illustrate a strong commitment to no-harm and equitable
utilization obligations complementing one another; however, the gap
between the Berlin Rules, which allow both legal concepts to coexist,
and the actual practice of these obligations by basin States is arguably
the leading challenge in negotiations during the GERD conflict.

III.

EQUITABLE UTILIZATION AND THE NO-HARM RULE: A
BATTLE FOR THE RIVER NILE

Conceptualizing the battle for the Nile demands adequate
historical, legal, and political analyses. Holistic outlooks in the region
have dictated the waterway’s allocation and use for centuries and are
currently advanced by riparian States with interests in the river.
Clashes often arise when international water law is applied to
transboundary watercourses because the interrelationship between
equitable utilization and no-harm remains unclear. This tension further
contributes to the GERD conflict as the international community
struggles to attribute a clear legal rationale behind the GERD’s
construction.
The GERD conflict illustrates the complex challenge that
national, regional, and international bodies face when attempting to
facilitate and negotiate a solution over water control. Egypt and
Ethiopia both lay claim to the Nile on the basis of international water
law; however, international law remains unsettled as to which claim is
more valid than the other, if any. If constructed, filled, and operated
successfully, the GERD provides the international legal community
with international water law precedent that can shift international
water law along the Nile and other transboundary waterways as
climate change alters national demands for water. While Egyptian
arguments appeal to the no-harm rule, prior use, and colonial and postcolonial legal agreements, Ethiopian arguments instead advance
equitable utilization and natural resource property ownership through
absolute territorial sovereignty.
81
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A. Egyptian Arguments to Preserve River Nile Control
Like many modern struggles for natural resource access and
control, political influence has contributed to notable power
imbalances. Egypt has historically justified its control over the Nile
through legal agreements made with its former colonizer, Britain.
Those legal agreements not only exclusively allocated the Nile’s
waters to Egypt and Sudan, but also granted Egypt with authority over
any upstream development projects; however, Ethiopia was not even
party to these agreements, calling into question the validity of the legal
authority Egypt has consistently relied upon. Egypt subsequently
invoked its prior use of the Nile through the appropriation doctrine to
advance its opposition to the GERD, which has largely been
subordinated to equitable utilization. Egypt’s strongest argument to
oppose Ethiopia’s full sovereignty to build and control the GERD
remains through the no-harm rule, a widely accepted and codified
principle of customary international water law. Egyptian strategy in
GERD negotiations has recently shifted from a focus on Egyptian
natural and historical rights to an emphasis on the no-harm rule in an
attempt to justify circumstantial Egyptian management of the GERD.
i.

The No-Harm Rule & Water Scarcity

Egypt’s strongest argument to sustain partial control over the
GERD stems from the no-harm rule. Within customary international
law, the no-harm rule requires that a State maintain its duty to prevent,
reduce, or control environmental harm to other States.82 Codified in
the Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourse Convention, and the Berlin
Rules, the no-harm rule ensures that Egypt’s downstream status along
the Nile affords it a form of protection from upstream construction that
could potentially harm Egypt’s access to water resources.
Climate change’s effects on the already dry, desert nation serve
as a great impetus for Egypt’s arguments against GERD construction
and Ethiopia’s exclusive GERD management. While Ethiopian Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed has told the United Nations General Assembly
that Ethiopia has “no intention” of using the GERD to harm Sudan and
Egypt, GERD negotiations have halted and remain at a bitter standstill.
Currently, Egypt and Sudan demand that any deal be legally binding
82
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over decisions to establish a dispute resolution mechanism for GERDrelated issues, and to designate GERD management and control during
periods of drought and reduced rainfall.83 However, before a resolution
among Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan was reached, Ethiopia unilaterally
began filling the GERD at approximately 5 billion cubic meters of
water in June 2020.84
Based on Egypt’s increasing demand for water and economic
activities, rapid population growth, and attempts to tackle the impacts
of climate change, Egypt maintains a compelling argument for
invoking the no-harm rule. With a population of 100 million, Egypt’s
population mostly lives along the Nile Valley, which is merely 6% of
Egypt’s total area surrounded by desert on both sides. Based on the
World Bank’s classification of water scarcity, Egypt meets the
definition with a government reported figure at 550 cubic meters of
freshwater per person annually.85
However, consequential questions arise about what the noharm rule in practice should look like: should it be a binding legal
arrangement between Egypt and Ethiopia that guarantees a quid pro
quo arrangement for all parties? Would Ethiopia continue its exclusive
authority over the GERD’s filling or would situations arise that
warrant other parties to restrict sole Ethiopian control? Because no
institutional framework exists to ensure the Nile Basin region is
governed fairly, equitably, efficiently, and sustainably, failure to craft
a legal arrangement that addresses the interplay between equitable
utilization and no-harm could contribute to a prolonged diplomatic
standstill.
In a radical shift from his predecessors, Egyptian President
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi recently addressed the United Nations
83
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announcing, “The Nile River must not be monopolized by one state.
For Egypt the Nile Water is an existential matter. This, however, does
not mean that we want to undermine the rights of our brothers and
sisters, sharing with us the Nile basin.”86 Egypt’s present negotiation
strategy is to pursue an agreement that permits Ethiopia to generate
hydropower from the GERD while minimizing the GERD’s potential
harm to downstream Egypt and Sudan.
ii.

The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation

Egypt has long relied on the doctrine of prior appropriation
(“appropriation doctrine”) to develop an argument that captures its
historical past reliance upon the Nile. The appropriation doctrine
provides that water rights are determined by priority of beneficial
use.87 In other words, a person, group, or State who first diverted the
Nile for a beneficial use or purpose may acquire individual rights to
the water, vesting the first appropriator with a recognized property
right.
The appropriation doctrine was first developed in California
during the Colorado Silver Boom in the mid-1800s.88 Gold miners
arriving in the United States were unable to proclaim riparian rights to
water because they did not own any land.89 Consequently, the miners
applied a rule that the first miner to use water productively would
automatically maintain the right to continue using the water and to
exclude others from its use.90 This property right vests for the
remainder of the individual’s life allowing for continued use of the
resource.91 However, what this principle of prior appropriation failed
to recognize was a right of pre-emption upon unappropriated water
supplies.92 While the first appropriator could lay claim to the water
used, she could not lay claim to waters that “had not yet been reduced
to possession.”93
86
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The appropriation doctrine has since evolved into the rule of
natural flow. Based on the rule of natural flow, riparian owners are
given “the right to have water flow past the land undiminished in
quantity or quality” where the idea of “first in time, first in right”
applies.94 As a result, land ownership does not affect or influence water
rights. The modern appropriation doctrine as a basis for Egyptian
control over the GERD fails to garner robust legitimacy. As a rigid
principle rooted in absolute claims of right, the appropriation doctrine
has become subordinate to equitable utilization through Article 6 of
the UN Watercourse Convention. Thus, prior appropriation is just one
of many factors considered when assessing equitable utilization and is
a frail justification for Egypt to secure GERD management control.
iii.

Natural & Historical Rights: The Nile Water Agreements

Historically, Egypt has controlled the Nile drawing legal rights
from a series of agreements with Britain called the Nile Water
Agreements. The Nile Water Agreements are composed of two treaties:
the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 Bilateral Agreement
between Egypt and Sudan. When negotiations were conducted for the
1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Ethiopia was not a British colony.
Ethiopia, or the Abyssinian Empire, was instead an independent
sovereign polity by the time the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was
concluded. Because Ethiopia was neither a signatory nor a participant
in the negotiations that directly led to the initial Nile Water Agreement,
Ethiopian government officials have steadily declined to recognize the
validity of the Nile Water Agreements and Egypt’s claim for natural
and historical rights over Nile waters.95
Moreover, British interests in Egyptian monopolization over
the River Nile at the commencement of the Nile Water Agreements
remains undeniable and central to the tale of equitable natural resource
distribution. The British’s agricultural interest in Egypt’s Nile Delta
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peaked during the United States Civil War.96 Most of Britain’s cotton
supply had been produced in the United States South, which was in the
middle of war with the United States North. As a result, the United
States cotton famine increased British reliance upon Egyptian cotton.
To minimize any potential disruption of its cotton supply, the British
bolstered its foreign policy within the region to secure its economic
dominance through the Nile Water Agreements, negatively impacting
upstream regions.97 Britain’s unrivaled bargaining power put upstream
riparian nations, many of which were British colonies, at a severe
disadvantage to gain Nile access. This also resulted in Egypt’s loss in
economic self-sufficiency with its agricultural industry transforming
into a one-crop cotton industry, wholly dependent upon the Nile
River’s waters.98
The 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
The 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty is a series of agreements
exchanged between the British, representing various Nile River Basin
countries, and Egypt & Sudan that allocated the Nile’s waters to these
two countries.99 The agreement includes a letter from Egypt’s
government to the British government and the Nile Commission’s
1925 report. Within these letters, both parties recognize Sudan’s need
for Nile water, yet the Egyptian government qualifies Sudan’s right by
declaring Egyptian natural and historical rights. One letter specifically
states that granting Sudan additional waters would be acceptable so
long as it “does not infringe Egypt’s natural and historical rights in the
waters of the Nile.”100 The agreement also constrains upstream riparian
abilities to build along the Nile if such construction would “entail any
prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water
96
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arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its level.”101
Ultimately, the series of agreements denied upstream nations, like
Ethiopia, access to the Nile for actions that could negatively affect the
Nile’s flow to downstream Egypt, including construction and
irrigation.102 At the time, Egypt encompassed the Sudan “for the
purpose of sharing Nile water.”103 Egypt argues that the 1929 AngloEgyptian Treaty provides the nation with “exclusive proprietary rights
to the Nile water without obligation, consent or even voluntary transfer
of property rights from Egypt to other riparian countries.”104

The 1959 Bilateral Agreement between Egypt and Sudan
The 1959 Bilateral Agreement between Egypt and Sudan
effectively replaced the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty by exclusively
allocating “the entire flow of the Nile water at Aswan to Egypt and
Sudan” and reinforcing the 1929 treaty.105 The 1929 and 1959 Nile
Water Agreements do not differ greatly. The 1959 Bilateral Agreement
simply accounts for vast political changes in the region and
agricultural demands. According to the 1959 Bilateral Agreement, the
Nile’s average flow was 84 billion cubic meters per year. Of these 84
billion cubic meters, evaporation and seepage accounted for 10 billion
cubic meters per year, and the remaining 74 billion cubic meters per
year would be divided between Egypt and Sudan where Egypt would
receive 48 billion cubic meters per year and 7.5 billion cubic meters
per year in benefits. Sudan would acquire 4 billion cubic meters per
year and 14.5 billion cubic meters per year in benefits.106 This
essentially disqualified other upstream, riparian States from attaining
water rights to the River Nile by only allocating 10% of the River Nile
to upstream States.107 With downstream nations Sudan and Egypt
obtaining water rights over the longest transboundary waterway in the
world, Egypt continues to exercise its power by strategically citing the
no-harm rule as an important source of customary international law to
protect itself from any upstream hydroelectric construction that would
101
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affect own developments. In contrast, Ethiopia has been unable to
assert authority over the Nile river.
As early as 1997 and 1998, Ethiopia’s Minister of Water
Resources and foreign minister announced, respectively:
As a source and major contribution of the Nile waters, Ethiopia has
the right to have an equitable share of the Nile waters and reserves
its rights to make use of its waters. There is no earthly force that can
stop Ethiopia from benefiting from the Nile.108

Today’s the GERD debate hinges on the question of whether the Nile
Water Agreements are binding legal agreements upon upstream
riparian nations like Ethiopia. If Egypt relies on the natural and
historical rights asserted through the Nile Water Agreements, it is
unlikely to make a compelling argument for controlling upstream
development, given that the agreements were made and concluded
without the participation of many upstream riparian nations.
B. Ethiopian Arguments to Gain River Nile Access
To justify its authority to build the GERD, Ethiopia repeatedly
asserts its absolute, upstream authority to develop along the Nile,
despite objections by its downstream neighbors Sudan and Egypt.
Home to the White Nile’s origin, Ethiopia houses the majority of the
White Nile’s waters within its highlands. Consequently, the upstream
nation invokes a property right argument to the Nile’s waters to justify
the GERD’s construction and Ethiopia’s exclusive management over
the GERD. However, this claim raises entitlement questions based on
the contentious principle of absolute sovereignty along an international
waterway, garnering objections from diplomatic and legal circles. Like
Egypt, Ethiopia’s most powerful claim stems from codified customary
international water law through equitable utilization with an emphasis
on Ethiopia’s scarce energy access.
i.

River Nile Ownership & The Ethiopian Highlands

Ethiopia’s highlands supply about 86% of the water that the
River Nile uses.109 Because the highlands flow into the Nile, Ethiopian
108
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government officials claim, to an extent, ownership over the Nile and
oppose Egyptian arguments that attempt to regulate Ethiopia’s GERD
construction and filling. Ethiopia’s property right argument invokes a
national sovereignty approach towards the GERD.
Ethiopia’s argument raises many questions, particularly as it
relates to which country may possess more or less of a transboundary
waterway. When contemplating the property right of a transboundary
waterway, is the property right attached to the land from which the
water originates or the land that provides most of the water used?
Similarly, does a property right originate from the land where most of
the water flows or the land where most of the water is used? Ironically,
by asserting an ownership right over a transboundary waterway to
justify the GERD’s construction and exclusive control over that
structure, the Ethiopian government mirrors the same flawed national
sovereignty argument invoked by Egypt. Ethiopia would have a
stronger argument by acknowledging an irrefutable co-riparian
reliance.
ii.

Equitable Utilization & Poverty Alleviation

Ethiopia’s use of equitable utilization to justify the GERD’s
construction and exclusive management of the Dam is the nation’s
strongest argument. It is no secret that Ethiopia has grappled with
widespread poverty, particularly through food insecurity and
malnutrition.110 However, the GERD’s potential to provide energy
access for a considerable number of Ethiopians who remain off the
nation’s power grid would enhance Ethiopia’s standard of living.111
The GERD is an attempt to develop Ethiopia’s hydroelectric capacity.
While Ethiopia’s highlands provide Ethiopians with an important
water source, only about 3% of Ethiopia’s hydropower potential had
been reached as of 2001.112 Historically, Ethiopians have relied on
other alternative forms of energy that have been more harmful to the
environment, including biofuel mass.113
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Ethiopian circumstances certainly warrant invoking equitable
utilization. Reaching Ethiopia’s untapped energy potential would also
make a difference in local communities for millions of Ethiopians.114
For instance, some Ethiopians are relying on their government’s
promise that the GERD will generate electricity to power their
businesses. As a result, individuals have poured their resources into
business investments, anticipating the GERD’s positive benefits.115
For them, the GERD’s failure would be a disaster to their livelihoods.
Ethiopia also contends that the GERD’s construction could create
benefits for the entire region, promoting equity. Through the GERD,
Ethiopia expects to produce enough electricity for the entire nation
with surplus amounts of energy, much of which could be exported and
sold for affordable prices to neighboring countries that do not have
substantial energy access.116 Energy sales could reach as far as China
and Western Europe, particularly given the non-African support and
financing of the GERD.117 Another benefit that Ethiopia cites is
environmental. Although it cannot be said with complete certainty,
simulations reveal that despite risks to Egyptian water supplies, the
filling period of the reservoir could benefit Ethiopia and Sudan without
significantly hindering Egyptian water users.118 However, subsequent
multi-year droughts would need to be managed with careful
coordination to avoid harmful impacts.119
Under equitable utilization, Ethiopia is entitled to greater Nile
access than through the anachronistic Nile Water Agreements. At the
same time, Ethiopia’s current efforts to account for potential
downstream harm within Egyptian borders are feeble and do not
sincerely incorporate the no-harm rule. If Ethiopia were to successfully
construct and fill its reservoir under the legal justification of equitable
utilization, without restrictions upon Ethiopian management, new
legal precedent could very well be established where international
water law’s principle of equitable utilization no longer considers the
no-harm rule essential.
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CONCLUSION
The GERD crisis has pushed legal proponents and opposition
to the Dam to explore diverse legal justifications. For each party in the
conflict, the strongest legal justifications stem from codified
international water law: equitable utilization and no-harm. With a
focus on the effects of climate change upon Egypt, the desert nation
could certainly invoke the no-harm rule to insist upon a quid pro quo
solution. At the same time, Ethiopia’s economic and social
circumstances warrant invocation of equitable utilization to increase
its Nile access. Nevertheless, the legal community struggles to explain
the interplay between no-harm and equitable utilization in practice.
The concrete response to the GERD conflict could very well
set the stage for new legal precedent that applies international water
law to transboundary waterways. For instance, if the filling results in
a disaster for Egypt, regional and international responses could call for
greater emphasis upon the no-harm rule in the future. On the other
hand, if the filling results in technological innovation and economic
prosperity that overshadows Egyptian water use strife, equitable
utilization could very well become completely divorced from the noharm rule. As circumstances evolve and climate change exacerbates
environmental and economic situations along transboundary
riverways, the legal community must confront a crucial legal question:
how the two competing principles should interplay. Either way, the
GERD’s filling and operation will help to answer that question and
solidify customary international water law.
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